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Payments System Risk: What Is It
and WhatWill Happen If We Try
To Reduce It?
0TH commercial banks and the Federal Re-
serve assume a certain amount of risk in partici-
rating in the payments system. This paper pro-
vides an introduction to payments system risk and
the public policy issues involved in limiting the
risk. Using simple balance sheet entries to illus-
trate, the paper will examine how policies in-
tended to reduce payments system risk would
affect banks and bank customers.
PAYMENTS SYSTEM RISK: WHAT IS
IT?
Manybanks overdraw their reserve accounts at
the Federal Reserve during part ofeach business
day as they process payments within the pay-
ments system. The Federal Reserve is concerned
about the extent of this intraday credit for several
reasons. First of all, since it does not charge inter-
est on the inti-aday credit it extends, it is providing
this overdraft facility at no cost to banks and, thus,
may he overused by banks. Second, and more im-
portant, it is possible, though unlikely, that abank
could failwhile its reserve account is overdr-awn.
In this event, the Federal Reserve would become a
general creditor of the failed bank. Finally, the Fed
is concerned with the risk that banks assume
through their participation in private wire transfer
systems. Current Federal Reserve policy is de-
signed to limit the risk assumed by Reserve Banks
as well as commercial banks who participate in
private systems for their electronic payments. See
appendix 1 for a description of that policy.)
Federal Reserve Iiavlight Overdrn/i
Risk anti the Operation ofFedwire
While various types of transactions affect the
reserve balances of banks, daylight overdt-afts gen-
erally reflect large transactions through Fedwire,
the wire transfer system operated by the Federal
Reserve System. Institutions with reserve orclear-
ing accounts at a Reserve Bank may transfer their
reserve balances to other institutions that have
similar accounts. These transfer-s, which averaged
$605 billion perbusiness day in 1987, are
processed electronically thi-ough Fedwire.
Federal Reserve Banks transfer reserves to re-
ceiving banks even ifthe reserve balance of the
sending bank is insufficient to coverthe transfers.
Transfers over Fedwire are “final” when the receiv-
ing banks are notified of the transfers. Thus, ifa
sending bank should fail while its reserve account
was over-drawn, the Federal Reserve would have
no claim on banks that received reserves fi-omn the
failed bank over Fedwire.
U.S. Treasury and agency securities also are
transferred among banks over Fedwire. Ownership
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records of these securities are maintained in each
Federal Reserve Bank’s computer system.Banks
cantransfer securities held in their names to other
institutions through these computers, a system
called “book-entry.” A transfer of securities in
book-envy form can be arrangedeither incon-
junction with a transferofreserves of equal value
or as a separate transaction. Such securities trans-
actions contribute to daylight overdrafts, since
typically the reserveaccounts of banks are debited
when theirbook-entry securities accounts are
credited. Transfers ofbook-entry securities over
Fedwire averaged $312 billion per day in 1987.
The Federal Reserve measures its exposure to
payments system risk by simply summing the
maximum daylight overdraft each day across all
banks. In 1987, the Fed’s exposure to daylight
overdrafts averaged $112 billion, approximately 53
percent ofwhich can be attributed to transactions
involving book-entry government securities.’ Some
specific features of this risk measure should be
noted. First, unlike conventional risk measures,
the Federal Reserve’s measure does not incorpo-
rate the probability that a bankwill fail while in an
overdraft position orthe probability of Fed losses
in such situations Since the Federal Reserve has
never incurred a loss on daylight overdrafts, the
probability oflosses in the future are quite low.
Second, it exceeds the actual sum ofreserve
account overdrafts at any point during the day;
the maximum overdrafts of individual banks typi-
cally occur at different times during the day.
Third, it represents the loss that the Federal Re-
serve would incuron a given day ifall banks with
overdrawn reserve accounts failed when their
overdrafts were at maximum levels and the Fed-
eral Reserve recovered nothing.
Systemic Risk and the Operation of
CHIPS
The ClearingHouse Interbank Payments System
(CHIPS) isan electronic payment system operated
by the NewYork Clearing House. It currently isthe
only private electronic payment system inopera-
tion in the United States.CHIPS has about 140
members, which include U.S-chartered banks and
foreign banks. Members of CHIPS send and receive
payment messages during the day; no funds are
actually transferred to coverthese payment mes-
sages, however, until the end ofthe day. Net obli-
gations are settled at day’s end through Fedwire
transfers in the reserveaccounts ofCHIPS partici-
pants. Banks in net debit positions on CHIPS at
the endof the day (value ofpayment messages
sent exceedsthe value ofpayment messages re-
ceived) transfer funds from their accounts at Re-
serve Banks to a reserve account maintained by
the clearing house at the Federal Reserve Bank of
NewYork, while banks in net credit positions re-
ceive reserve transfers from that account. The
value of payment messages processed by CHIPS
averaged $555 billion perday in 1987.
Systemic risk refers to the risk that the failure of
one bank will cause one or more otherbanks to
fail. One waythat this could happen is through
participation in CHIPS. Ifa bank fails while in a net
debit position on CHIPS, other- CHIPS participants
could suffer losses as well,depending on the pro-
cedures in force for dealing with such a default.
Payments over Fedwire, in contrast, involve no
systemic risk. The Federal Reserve would absorb
anylosses resulting from failures by banks with
overdrawn reserve accounts -
The Federal Reserve measures the payments
system risk assumed by CHIPS participants as the
sum of their maximum net debit positions during
the day on CHIPS.This measure averaged $43.7
billion in 1987.
To relate this measure to systemic risk is dif-
ficult, however; under current CHIPS rules, pay-
ment messages do not reflect intraday extensions
ofcredit among banks but provisional payments
which may be unwound at the end of the day. Ifa
bank could not cover its net debit position on
CHIPS atthe end of the day, all payment messages
to and from that bank would be canceled; newnet
debit and credit positions would thenbe calcu-
latedfor the remaining CHIPS participants, and
payments would be made to coverthese revised
positions. Unwinding CHIPS payments because of
a defaultingbank, however, could expose the re-
maining CHIPS participants to losses iftheir de-
‘Daylight overdrafts attributed to transactions in book-entry
securities are calculated as follows. A bank is in a net credit
position on book-entry securities transfers if the value ofsecuri-
ties transferred to the bank’s book-entry securities account
exceeds the value of securities transferred outof that account
to other banks. The book-entry overdraftof a bank for each day
equals its largest net credit position on securities transfers that
occurs while the reserve account of the bank is overdrawn.
‘In conventional definitions, risk is specified in terms ofthe
probability distribution of returns on an investment. Under one
definition, risk may be measured as the variance of the distribu-
tion ofreturns. See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUISpositors had withdrawn balances credited to their
accounts during the daybased on payment mes-
sages from the defaulting bank.These banks in
turn may be unable to recover the funds with-
drawn by their depositors during the day.’
Federal Reserve Policy on Payments
System Risk
In recent years, the Federal Reserve Board has
takenactions to limit its own risk and thesystemic
risk involved in CHIPS.The Federal Reserve in-
duced CHIPS to require each bankin its system to
establish bilateral net debit limits with each other
CHIPS participant, beginning in 1984. Under an-
otherprogram thatwent into effect in March 1986,
the Federal Reserve requires banks to set limits on
theirdaylight overdrafts across Fedwireand
CHIPS. (Seeappendix 1 for details of these poli-
cies .1 The Fed is currently studying proposals to
establish an explicit or implicit price fordaylight
overdrafts of reserve accounts.
HOW PAYMENTSAFFECT RISK
This section uses simple balance sheets ofhy-
pothetical banks to illustrate howtransactions
through thepayments system affect theexposure
of the Federal Reserve and commercial banks to
potential losses. The illustrations involve federal
funds transactions and transactions among CHIPS
participants. Appendix 2 illustrates how the pay-
ment practices of banks that serve government
securities dealers and those that issue and redeem
commercial paper affect their reserve overdrafts.
Federal Funds Transactions
Banks that borrow federal funds overnight are
concerned primarilyabout their reserve balances
as of the end ofthe day, rather than during the
day, fortwo reasons. First, the Federal Reserve is
more tolerant of daylight overdrafts of reserve
accounts than ofnegative reservebalances at the
close ofbusiness. Second, the intraday reserve
balances do not count toward meeting reserve
requirements; only those balances held at the end
of the business daydo.
Banks that borrow overnight federal funds typi-
cally receive reserves from the lending banks over
Fedwire late in the day; they return the requisite
reserve balances the following morning. Such
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transfers can cause the borrowingbanks toover-
drawtheir reserve balances during the day.
The balance sheet entries in table I illustrate
how federal funds transactions affect the risk
borne by the Federal Reserve - Each bank begins
the day with deposits of $100 and reserves of $10.
With a 10 percent reserve ratio, excess reserves are
zero. During the previous business day, Bank A
borrowed $25 from Bank B through the federal
funds market. Before the end of business on the
previous day, Bank B transferred $25 over Fedwire
from its reserve account to the account ofBankA.
This transaction created a liability for Bank A (fed-
eralfunds purchased) and shifted $25 of the assets
of Bank B from reservebalances to federal funds
sold.
The first transaction by Bank A in the current
dayis a transfer of $25 from its reserve account to
thereserve account of Bank B, returning the funds
it had borrowed overnight; this eliminates the
liability offederal funds purchased by Bank A.
Since the balance in the reserve account of Bank A
was only $10 at the start of the day, the transfer of
$25 makes its reserveaccount overdrawn by $15.
Thispresents no problem forBank A, howet?er,
since it plans toborrow$25 through the federal
funds market later in the day to eliminate its re-
serve overdraft and meet its reserverequirement
of $10.
If Rank A borrows the $25 in the federal funds
market, the lending bank(s) will transfer the re-
serves to the account of Bank A in the afternoon.
Given the time gap between the transfer offunds
to lending banks in the morning and the transfer
of reserves to Bank A in the afternoon, the Federal
Reserve effectively lends $15 to BankA during part
of the business day by permitting the reserve
overdraft.
The Fed isa general creditor ofBank A while its
reserve account is overdrawn. To illustrate the risk
it assumes in permitting daylight overdrafts, sup-
pose that participants in the federal funds market
find out that the value of Bank A’s assets havede-
clined by $15 just after Bank A transfers $25 to
Bank B.After this information becomes known,
Bank Awill be unable toborrow reserves in the
federal funds market at prevailing market rates.
The agency that chartered Bank A must decide
whether it is solvent - IfBank A is declared solvent
and has assets to pledge as collateral, it could
‘The legal status of claims by the banks against theirdepositors
in such situations is currently unclear. See Mengle (1989).
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Ifthe Federal Reserve had known that Bank A
was in poor financial condition, it would have
required the bank to pledge collateral against its
overdrafts.’ By requiring collateral, the Fed shifts
the risk to other parties. Suppose, in this case, that
Bank A had pledged $15 of its riskiess assets to the
Feder-al Reserve to cover its overdrafts. When the
bank fails, the Fed would hold the $15 in collateral
Transactions Among GHJPS
Participants
In the case illustrated in table 1, the Federal
Reserve assumes the risk. Banks also assume risk
by participating in CHIPS. The interbank riskexpo-
sures created through the processing of payment
messages through CHIPS are illustrated in table 2.
In the first transaction of the day,a depositor of
Bank A sends $25 to adepositor of Bank B in the
‘Task Force (1988), pp. 65—69
receive a loan from the Federal Reserve to coverits
reserve overdraft. Ifthe supeMsory agency de-
clares Bank A insolvent, it will be closed. IfBank A
is closed and liquidated, the depositors get fir-st
claim on the Silo of “other assets.” In this case,
the Federal Reserve will receive $10 against the $15
overdraft ofthe reserve account and) thus, will
lose $5.
to cover any losses.The loss of $5 would he borne
by uninsured depositors or the Feder-al Deposit
Insurance Corporation FOIC). Thus, requiring
collateral against reserve over-drafts does not nec-
essarily protect the public sector; it may simply
shift the loss from the Federal Reserve to the FDIC.
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form ofa wire tr’ansferover CHIPS. Bank A debits
the deposit account ofthat customer for $25. Be-
cause banks do not report their balance sheets on
an intraday basis, thereis no official term for the
offsetting liability entry in this transaction. In this
case,we will call it “reserves payable.” For Bank B,
deposit liabilities and an asset item called ‘re-
serves receivable” each increase by $25.
In the next transaction, a depositor of Bank B
directs it to send $25 to a customerofBank C.
After the second transaction, Bank B is evenwith
CHIPS. Ifthere were no more transactions over
CHIPS that day involving Bank B, the settlement
for CHIPS transactions would haveazero impact
on the reserve account ofBank B. Bank A, in con-
trast, would have its reserve account debited for
$25, while BankC would have its account credited
by $25. Bank A would have to increase its reserve
balance before the time for settlement of CHIPS
payments to facilitate settlement.
Suppose that, before the end of the day, adverse
publicity prevents Bank A from borrowing $25 in
the federal funds market. This situation could
create a liquidity problem for Bank B - If Bank A
cannot obtain sufficient reserves to coverits net
debit position on CHIPS, current rnles call for
unwinding all transactions involving Bank A and
settling the transactions among the remaining
CHIPS participants. This settlement would involve
atransfer of $25 in reserves from Bank B to Bank C.
Such a net settlement cannot take place, however,
because Bank B has only $10 in its reserveac-
count. Thus, unless the Federal Reserve lends $25
to Bank A orBank B, all CHIPS transactions for the
day would be canceled.
Simulation exercises indicate that the unwind-
ingoftransactions with one large CHIPS partici-
pant that cannot meet its payment obligations
would make a high percentage of other partici-
pants unable to meet their commitments on
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CHIPSwithout additional reserves.’ In these exer-
cises,some banks that become illiquid have no
direct transactionswith the defaulting bank. Thus,
as illustrated in table 2, a default by Bank A keeps
Bank C from receiving its payments over CHIPS,
because the default by Bank A makes Bank B
illiquid.
As the central hank, the Federal Reserve is re-
sponsible for preventing such a liquidity crisis. In
our example, the Fed could lend reserves eitherto
Bank A or Bank B. Ifit considers Bank A to be sol-
vent, it could lend the $25 and take collateral. The
$25 added to the reserve account of BankA facili-
tates the net settlement on CHIPS. IfBank A turns
out to be insolvent, the collateral protects the Fed-
eral Reserve from loss, transferring it instead to the
general creditors and the FDIC.
Alternatively,the Federal Reserve could prevent
a liquidity crisis by lending $25 to Bank B, allowing
Bank B to meet its required reserves and CHIPS
obligation to Bank C. Even ifthe Fed prevents a
liquidity crisis by lending $25 to Bank B, the de-
fault of BankA could make Bank B insolvent. This
is an example of systemic risk involved in the op-
eration of the payments system. Suppose that the
transfer of $25 fr’om Bank B to Bank C is initiated
by the depositor ofBank B who received $25 from
Bank A. Bank B makes this transfer’before discov-
ering the default by Bank A. At ths time, it is not
clear whether the courts would permit Bank B to
regain these funds from its depositor? IfBank B’s
loss exceeds $10, it is bankrupt.
Suppose, instead, that this depositor- of Bank B
holds the extra $25 in its demand deposit account
at Bank B until the end of the day.The transfer of
reserves from Bank B to Bank C was initiated by a
different depositor of Bank B. When Bank A’s de-
fault is discovered, Bank B could cancel the $25 in
reserves receivable and reverse the $25 credit to its
demand deposit liabilities. In this case, the un-
winding of the CHIPS transaction has no adverse
effect on the net worth of Bank B,
THE EFFECTS OF POSSIBLE
CHANGES IN POLICY
Changes in policy on payments system risk are
being discussed within the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem and the private sector. This section illustrates
the effects of two possible policy changes: explicit
fees on reserve account overdrafts and interest-
earning r-eserve balances required to coverpart or
all of daylight overdrafts?
Federal Reserve policymakers have indicated
that such changes would be adopted only after
CHIPS has developed arrangements for ensuring
the execution of payments on that system that
they consider acceptable.s This section also illus-
trates the implications ofsuch an arrangement for
banks.
Explicit Pricing ofDaylight Overdrafts
ofReserve Accounts
One wayto reduce Federal Reserve risk would
be to charge a fee on daylight overdrafts. If the fee
were high enough, banks would reduce the size of
their overdrafts by changing their practices for’
making payments.
Responses ofBanks to Pricing Daylight Over-
drafts — Perhaps the easiest and least expensive
change for most of the relatively largebanks would
involve routing more of their wire transfers of
funds through CHIPS rather than Fedwire. There
are otherways forbanks toreduce their reserve
account overdrafts. They could purchase more of
their federal funds as term federal funds or under
rollover arrangements that involve paying a daily
rate but eliminating the daily transfer ofieserve
balances. Pricingtotal daylight overdrafts ofre-
serve balances (including book-entry overdrafts)
would impose costs on the clearing banks, which
they would pass on to the government securities
dealers they serve. The dealer-s could reduce book-
entry daylight overdrafts by building smaller- in-
ventories ofsecurities dur-ing the day or’ holding
larger inventor-ies overnight. Banks that act as
agents in issuing commer-cial paper could charge
‘Humphrey (1986).
‘Mengle (1989).
‘For discussions ofthese possible changes from Federal Re-
serve sources, see Belton, et al. (1987), Corrigan (1987),
Johnson (1988), Task Force (1988) and Mengle, et at. (1987).
Fordiscussions of these issues bythose in the private sector,
see Flannery (1987), Faulhaber, et at. (1989) and Large Dollar
Payments System Advisory Group (1988). Governor Wayne D.
Angell of the Federal Reserve Board has proposed another
approach to revising policy on payments system risk. Under
the Angell proposal, the Federal Reserve would prohibit day-
light overdrafts. Transfers of reserves that would make the
reserve balance of a bank negative would be funded as dis-
count window loans. To provide banks incentives to hold
enough reserves to prevent overdrafts, the Federal Reserve
would pay interest on excess reserves, but at a rate belowthe
discount rate. See VanHoose (1988).
‘Johnson (1988), p. 15.
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issuers for the fees on overdrafts or delay pay-
ments to issuers until they receive payments from
purchasers.
Effects in Financial Markets — Pricing daylight
overdrafts could have avarietyof indirect effects in
the financial markets. Banks that lend in the over’-
nightfederal funds market could find that their
reserves are being returned later thefollowing day.
The time value of intraday reserves might lead to
the development of an intraday federal funds mar-
ket, with lenders making reserve balances available
to borrowers for only part ofthe business day.
Some analysts think this could lead to greater
variability in an overnight federal funds rate and
other interest i-ates.°
Banks could limit the size of their-daylight over-
drafts by delaying wire transfers offunds for- de-
positors that do not demand immediate delivery
of funds; or, the might charge an extrafee to de-
positors that demand immediate delivery.
Clearing banks would charge government secu-
rities dealers for the cost of the fee on daylight
overdr-afts. Government securities dealers, in turn,
would increase the transaction costs of buying
and selling gover-nment securities. Interest rates
on government securities would rise somewhat
relative to yields on alternative investments, in-
creasing the Treasury’s cost of servicing the na-
tional debt.
Howbanks react to daylight overdraft fees could
affect market yields on other financial instru-
ments. Forinstance, the fee on overdrafts would
increase the costs to banks acting as agents for
fir-msthat issue cornmner-cial paper. The r-esponses
by the agent banks could increase the costs to
fir’ms of raising funds by issuing commercial
paper.”
Supplemental Balance Requirement
The Federal Reserve could impose an implicit
price on daylight overdrafts by requiring the banks
that overdraw their reserve accounts to hold sup-
plemental reserve balances. These requirements
would be set to cover part or all of their daylight
overdrafts. The suggested interest rate to be paid
on the supplemental balances would be slightly
below thefederal funds rate, thus creating an op-
portunity cost ofholding supplemental reserves.
This cost would have the same implications for
bank behavior and financial markets as an equal
explicit fee on daylight overdrafts.
The implications of a supplemental reserve re-
quir-ement can be examined by adjusting the bal-
ance sheet entries in table 1. In this case, Bank A
would be required to increase its average end-of-
day reserve balance by $15. A reserve balance of
$25 at the start ofthe daywould eliminate the risk
of Federal Reserve loss because Bank A’s reserve
balance would not fall below zeio after the $25
transfer.
The method by which Bank A r’aises the $15
supplemental balance affects the distribution of
potential losses among participants in the banking
industry. Suppose,for example, Bank A sold some
assets to obtain the $15 in additional reserves. This
response would raise the risk-adjusted capital
r-atio of Bank A, unless it shifted the remaining
$110 ofother-assets into categories with higher-
riskweights. A rise in BankA’s risk-adjusted capi-
tal ratio would reduce the FDIC’s potential
losses.”
Suppose, instead, that Bank A r’aises the 515 in
supplemental reserves by increasing federally
insured deposits from $100 to $115. This response
would increase the potential losses faced by the
FDIC.”
Bank A also could raise the additional $15 in the
term federal funds market. The claims of those
selling term federal funds to BankA would he
subordinate to the claims of Bank A’s depositors.
Thus, the supplemental balance requirement
would shift risk to those banks supplying the term
‘Task Force (1988), pp. 103—14.
‘°Toillustrate the potential effects on the cost of issuing commer-
cial paper, suppose the Federal Reserve charges 100 basis
points at an annual rate on the maximum daylight overdraftof
each bank. See Mengle, et al. (1987) for the basis for such a
rate. If an agent bank continues the timing ofpayments de-
scribed in appendix 2 in issuing and redeeming commercial
paper, the overdrafts fee would cost $54.79per $1 million of
commercial paper issued and redeemed. If the banks pass this
cost on to the issuers, the annual costof raising funds by
issuing commercial paper every 30 days would rise by 7 basis
points.
“A risk-based capital ratio is calculatedas a measure of capital
divided byweighted assets, with weights assigned as approxi~
mations to relative risk. Reserves have a weight of zero. See
“Proposals for International Convergence” (1988).
“Assume that these additionalfederally insured deposits have a
zero reserve requirement. To illustrate the implications for
FDIC risk, suppose that after Bank A transfers $25 to Bank B,
there is a public announcement of events that reduce the value
of the assets of Bank A by $15. Bank A fails and the FDIC
becomes the receiver. As receiver, the FDIC obtains assets
worth $110 and assumes liabilities of $115, for a net loss of $5.
In this case, therefore, the supplementalbalance requirement
shifts risk from the Federal Reserve to the FDIC.10
federal funds, increasing the systemic risk in the
banking system.
Of course, supplemental balance requirements
also would give banks an incentive to reduce the
size of the intraday movements in their reserve
balances, since the interest rate paid on the bal-
ances would be below the marginal return on
other assets and below the interest rate on federal
funds. The supplemental balance requirement
would be i-educed to the extent that a bank kept
its reservebalance positive throughout the busi-
ness day. Suppose, for instance, that Bank A
changes its intraday pattern of payments so that,
with the supplemental requirement of $15, its
reserve balance never fallsbelow $5. The Federal
Reserve might reduce its supplemental balance
requirement to $10, thus reducing the opportunity
cost of Bank A.
Provisionsfor Settlement flnalitr of
Payments over CHIPS
Settlement finality would involve procedures for
ensuring the execution of payments (avoid un-
winding payments involving a defaulting bank)
and the allocation of losses in the event ofa de-
fault by a CHIPS participant.” Iflosses are spr-ead
widely among CHIPS participants, the failurvt of a
CHIPS participant to meet its payment obligation
would probably not cause other banks to fail.
The implications of settlement finality arrange-
ments for payments system risk are illustrated
using the balance sheet entries in table 2. In this
illustration, CHIPS is presumed to have formed a
bankers’ bank,which is a cooperative venture that
performs banking services for CHIPS members.
This institution processes payment messages for
its members as debit and credit entries to their
demand deposit accounts at the bankers’ bank.’1
The illustration is based on some general princi-
ples of settlement finality arrangements that have
been consider-ed for several years.”
The hypothetical ar-r’angement requires mem-
bers ofCHIPS as agroup to pledge enough collat-
eral with their bankers’ bank to cover the largest
net debit position of any one participant. This is
based on the idea that a default by one large par-
ticipant would disrupt the oper-ation of CHIPS.
Since there has never been a default by a CHIPS
participant, however, adefault by one large partic-
ipant is an unlikely event. Collateral requirements
for CHIPS participants in excess of the largest net
debit of an individual CHIPS participant could he
interpreted as an excessive degree of precaution.
In table 2, the largest net debit position is $25.
To cover this position (and to allow some margin
for- error), CHIPS requires each ofthe three banks
to pledge $10 of their interest-earning assets with
CHIPS in the form of Treasury securities.
Suppose that after CHIPS processes the transac-
tions described in table 2, an announcement indi-
cates a $15 loss in the value ofBank A’s assets.
tinder the settlement finality arrangement, CHIPS
would use the collateral posted by its participants
to raise $25, either by selling part of the collateral
“Discussions of the finality of payments on private wire transfer
systems mention three aspects of finality. Sender finality
makes each message overthepayments system final when
sent. Payment messages cannot be canceled later in the day.
The rules for payment messages on CHIPSinclude sender
finality.
Settlement finality refers to procedures that would ensure the
settlement of payments if a participantdefaults on its net debit
at the end of the day. CHIPS does not have settlement finality
procedures in place at this time. Under current procedures,
CHIPS would cancel all payments by the bank that defaults, as
well as all payments to that bank, and calculate newnet debit
or credit positionsfor the remaining participants. This section
illustrates the implications of adopting a form of settlement
finality.
Under receiver finality, credits to the deposit accounts of the
customersof CHIPSparticipants would be final when the
receiving banks receive payments messages over CHIPS. If a
sending bank defaults, the receiving bank would have no
recourse to its depositors. CHIPS rules do not include receiver
finality. For additional discussion of these aspects of the finality
of payments, see Humphrey(1986) and Belton, et al. (1987).
“CHIPS has considered developing a bankers’ bank toensure
that payment obligations over CHIPS would be treated as net
ratherthan gross obligations in the case of a default by a
CHIPS participant. See Kantrow (1988)-To illustrate the signifi-
cance ofthe distinction between gross and net obligations,
suppose a bank fails while it is in a net credit position on
CHIPSpayments. If CHIPS obligations are treated legally as
net obligations, CHIPS participants would make a payment to
the receiver of the failed bank for the amount of the net debit
position. The receiver of the failed bank might sue CHIPS
participants based on gross obligations. Under a successful
suit by the receiver, those that had sent payment messages to
thefailed bank would have to pay the gross amount ofthose
payments, and those who received payment messages from
the failed bank would become its general creditors for the
amount of the gross transfers from the failed bank. This treat-
ment ofCHIPS participants would increase the recovery rateof
the failed bank’s othergeneral creditors. There have been no
such cases to indicate whether the courtswould uphold pay-
mentsto the receiver based on gross payments.
Suppose, in contrast, that CHIPSpayments are processed
through demand deposit accounts at the bankers’ bank for
CHIPS. Under that arrangement, the only claimof the receiver
of the failed bank would be for thepositive balance of the failed
bank in its demand deposit account at the bankers’ bank.
“Mengle (1989).
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orusing the securities as collateral for a loan at
theFederal Reserve discount window. CHIPS
would then transfer the $25 to the reserve account
ofBank B, facilitating the payment from Bank B to
Bank C. In turn, the bankers’ bank of CHIPS would
hold the $10 in collateral posted by Bank A and
have a $15 claim against BankA as a general credi-
tor-. Losses on the $15 claim against BankAwould
thus he spread between Bank B and Bank C. Nei-
ther bank would be forced into bankruptcy by a
complete loss on the $15 claim.
From the Federal Reserve’s perspective, this
settlement finality arrangement is better than the
procedure that currently would be used to deal
with a default by a CHIPS participant — unwind-
ing payments involving the bank. Ifthis settlement
finality arrangement were in place, the unwinding
ofpayments, which would disrupt the flow of
payments in the economy, could be avoided. Ifa
discount window loan was necessary to avoid a
liquidity crisis in the banking system, the collat-
eral would be available through the CHIPS organi-
zation. The Federal Reserve would not have to
decide which banks should receive discount win-
dow loans.
Bymaking the risk to CHIPS participants more
explicit, the arrangement would give CHIPS partic-
ipants stronger incentives to exclude banks in
relatively poor- financial condition fiom their sys-
tem. Banks that are excluded would route their
wrre transfers through Fedwire, thus reducing
systemic risk. Finally, the spreading of potential
losses would limit the chances of the failure of one
bank causing others to fail. It is not possible to
determine whether the risk of bank failure is lower
under current CHIPS pr-ocedures or under this
proposed procedure for settlement finality. Such a
comparison depends on the extent towhich de-
positors of CHIPSparticipants drawdown the
intraday credits to their demand deposit accounts
and the success that banks would have in collect-
ing from those depositors in case ofadefault by a
CHIPS participant.
CONCLUSIONS
All banks assume some risk by participating in
the payments system. The payment pr-actices that
generate this risk were developed in an environ-
ment in which ther-e was no interest charge on
intraday credit amid, until recently, no constraints
on the magnitude ofintraday credit. There have
been no losses to the Federal Reserve or’ to mcm-
hers of private wire transfer systems resulting from
the daylight credit exposures. The Federal Re-
serve, however’, has adopted apolicy on payments
system risk which includes limits on the daylight
over-drafts of individual banks.
The Fed has been considering possible changes
in its policy to reduce its own risk and provide
incentives for banks to change the payment prac-
tices that tend to create the intraday risk expo-
sures. One proposed approach involves a fee on
daylight overdrafts ofreserve accounts. A second
appr-oach, which involves an implicit price on
daylight overdrafts, requir-es additional reserve
balances at the banks which regularly overdr’aw
their- reserve accounts during the day. The Federal
Reserve would pay interest on these supplemental
reserve balances at arate just below the federal
funds rate, tinder either-approach, CHIPS would
be required to work out an arrangement that is
satisfactory to the Federal Reserve to ensur-e the
finality of its payments.
The objective ofchanging the policy on pay-
ments system risk is to reduce the risk of the Fed-
eral Reserve without creating a large increase in
systemic risk — the risk that the failure of one
bank will cause the failtrr-e ofother banks, thus
disr-upting the operation ofthe payments system.
The type ofsettlement finality ar-rangement de-
sired by the Federal Reserve would ensure the
execution of payments overCHIPS in the event of
adefault by a CHIPS participant and spread any
losses so widely among other CHIPS par-ticipants
that one bank failure is unlikely to lead to the fail-
ure ofother CFIIPS participants.
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Current Federal Reserve Policy on Payments
System Risk
Currently, the Federal Reserve uses specific
limits on daylight overdrafts ofreserve accounts
and net debit positions on privatewire transfer
systems to reduce payments system risk. The lim-
its on net debit positions apply to any private wire
transfer system that settles the netpositions of its
participants through transfers of balances in re-
serve or clearing accounts at Reserve Banks. Since
CHIPS is the only such system in operation, the
following description refers onlyto it, but would
apply to any such systemn developed in the future.1
Bilateral Net Credit Limits on CHIPS
The Federal Reserve requires each participant
on CHIPS to set a limit on its net credit position on
message transfers with each of the other’ partici-
pants in the system. Funds transfer- messages that
violate these bilateral net credit limits are rejected
by the computer- system that processes payment
messages. CHIPS participants havehad bilateral
credit limits since October 1984.
Sender Net Debit Caps on CHIPS
The Federal Reserve requires CHIPS to establish
limits on the net debit positions of each partici-
pant with all other participants on the system
CHIPS sets this liniit for each participant at 5 per-
cent of the sum of all bilateral credit limits for that
participant extended by all other CHIPS partici-
pants.2 CHIPS established these sender net debit
caps in October 1985.
Cross-System Caps
Eachbank that occasionally has daylight reserve
overdrafts is required to adopt a cap on its cross-
system daylight overdraft. Cross-system refers to
the daylight overdraft position on Fedwir-e and
CHIPS.The relevant over-draft position for this cap
is the sum of a bank’sfunds-related overdraft of its
reserve account and its net debit position on
CHIPS at each moment during the day.Each bank
sets its cap by placing itself in one of the possible
categories indicated in table Al; banks are directed
to consider their- creditworthiness, credit policies
and operational control and procedures. Each
possible rating has corresponding caps for’both
the one day and two-week average maximum day-
light overdraft, each as a percentage of primary
adjusted capital. These percentages havebeen
‘For an analysis of the effects ofthese credit limits on daylight
overdrafts and the operation of the payments system, see Bel-
ton, et al. (1987).
‘There are additional details involved in determining these limits.
See Belton, et al. (1987).
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUISTable Al
Caps on Daylight Overdrafts Across Payments Systems
(multiples of adjusted primary capital)
Self- Cap Period caps in effect
assessment applied March 27.1986 to January 14. 1988 May 19.1988
category to January 13, 1988 to May 18, 1988 to present
High Two-week
average 2000 1 700 1.500
Single day 3 000 2 550 2 250
Above Two-week
average average 1.500 1 275 1 125
Single day 2 500 2.125 1.875
Average Two-week
average 1.000 0.850 0.750
Single day 1500 1275 1.125
Limited Two-week
average 0 500 0 425 0 375
Single day 0500 0.425 0.375
NOTE: Adjusted primary capital for U.S -chartered banks is the sum of primary capital less all intangible
assets and deferred net losses on loans and other assets sold
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bulletin (November 1987). p 843
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Table A2
Risk Created by Transferring Depositor’s Funds over Fedwire
Balance sheets at start of day:
Bank A Bank B
Reserves $10 Deposts 5100 Reserves S 10 Deoosils 5100
Other Net Other Net
-assets 100 worth IQ assems 100 won
1
: 10
Bank A sends $25 ofdepositor’s moneyto Bank B over Fedwure:
BankA Bank B
A few banks incur lan-ge daylight overdrafts be-
cause ofthe transactions they conduct forcus-
tomers that deal in U.S. gover-nment securities.
These tr’ansactionswarrant special examination. A
few large banks (called clearing banks) specialize
in serving government securities dealers; these
banks generate alarge share of the total daylight
overdr-afts of bank reserve accounts. in the second
quarter of 1988 for example, four clearing banks
accounted for about 70 percent of the daylight
overdrafts attributable to transactions in book-
entry securities.
Business Practices of Dealers and Clearing
Banks — Government securities dealers who buy
and sell securities for their customers have no
direct access to the book-entry system for’ transfer-
ring ownership ofgovernment securities. Instead,
they maintain book-entry securities accounts and
demand deposit accounts with commercial banks
Daylight overdrafts of the clearing banks’ reserve
accounts reflect the practices of the government
securities dealers in managing their inventories of
governments securities. Dealen’s hold large inven-
tories of securities during the day to meet the
anticipated demands of their customers. To mini-
mize the cost of holding the inventories, the deal-
ers sell most of their secum-ities by the end of the
daythrough repurchase agreements. The inves-
tors who enter into these agreements “own” the
secur’ities overnight and “resell” them to dealers
early the next day. Thus, the dealers build their’
inventories ofgovernment securities in the mon-n-
ing of each business day by receiving securities
returned by the overnight repo investors and buy-
ing additional securities offered for sale.’
The following featur-es ofthe business practices
ofgovernment securities dealers explain why they
genen-ally wait until early afternoon to begin run-
For a more completediscussion of the practices ofclearing
banks and dealers, see Association of Reserve City Bankers
(1986).
Securities Transfers that serve as their clearing banks for securities
transfers.
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ning down their inventory ofsecurities. Salesmen
for a dealer make commitments to deliver specific
securities to its customers by the end of the day.
The dealer is then vulnerable to losses ifit cannot
fulfillthese commitments. The customer-sreceive
inter-est on the pr’ornised securities for that day,
even if the dealer does not make delivery. The
customer’s, however, make payments to the deal-
ers only when the securities are delivered. The
dealer would fail to make delivery if it could not
locate the desired secun’ities in its inventory or in
the market, or if it sent the wrong securities to a
customer’ and had them returned. Each dealer
attempts to minimize the probability of such
‘fails” by waiting until earls’ after-noon to dim-ect its
clearingbank to send its securities to the book-
entry accounts of the banks that serve the cus-
tomers that have bought them.
Another reason the dealers hold their securities
until earlyafternoon involvespotential profits
from special orders. Onsome days, certain issues
of government securities ar’ein relatively high
demand. The dealers can make larger profits if
they have securities available to meet these special
orders. In contrast to the specific requirements for
special orders, dealers may substitute awide vari-
ety of securities as acceptable collateral for repos.
Effects on lntraday Reserve Balances —
These dealer practices affect the intraday patterns
of theirdemand deposit balances and the reserve
balances of the clearing banks that senve them.
When a m’epo investor’ retur-ns the securities to the
dealer-, then-c is an increase in the securities ac-
count of the dealer- at its clearing bank and an
equal reduction in its demand deposit account.
Onthe books ofthe Federal Reserve, there is an
increase in the securities in the book-entry ac-
count of the clearing bank and a n’eduction in the
r-eserveaccount of the cican-ing hank. The same
transactions occur’ when the dealer buys securi-
ties to hold in its inventory that day. The dealer
builds its inventory of securities by oven-dr-awing
its demand deposit account during the day. The
dealers do not control the timing of these inflows
of securities to their’ accounts and the outflows
from their demand deposit accounts, since the
party that holds the securities initiates the transfer
of securities and r-esen’ves through the F’edwir’e
system.
The process of overdrawing r’eserve and deposit
accounts is reversed later’in the day as the dealer-s
sell their inventor-ies ofsecurities. The reserve
accounts of the clearingbanks rise as the book-
entry securities are transferred to the accounts of
other banks and reserve balances are simultane-
ously transferred to the accounts of the clearing
banks. The timing oftr’ansactions in book-entry
securities for the dealers causes the reserve ac-
counts of the clearing banks to be overdrawn by
billions of dollar-s during part ofthe day.
Implications for Risk— The clearing banks
extend credit to government securities dealers
during the day by allowing them to overdraw their
demand deposit accounts. The banks limit their
risk byobtaining a lien against the securities held
for’ the account of the dealers. Thus, a clearing
bank could claim the securities credited to the
account of a dealer’ to cover any losses on its de-
posit overdraft
The Federal Reserve has considered various
methods of establishing liens against the securi-
ties in the book-entry accounts of banks but has
not initiated such collateral arrangements. Thus,
the Fed is vulnerable to losses on the full amount
of abank’s reserve oven-draft, whether the overdraft
was generated through funds transfers or transac-
tions in book-entry securities?
The risk implications ofbook’entry overdrafts
can be illustrated by examining the balance sheet
entries in table AZ. BankAi sa clearing bank for’ a
governments securities dealer. The dealer receives
$25 in book-entry securities and has its demand
deposit account debited by $25, leaving it over-
drawn at that time. Suppose the dealer goes bank-
rupt after this transaction is completed. Bank A
claims the $25 in securities that were credited to
the securities account of the dealer to cover any
possible losses on the deposit overdraft. Thebank
is spared any losses, and the Federal Reserve suf-
fers no losses.
‘Ibis hook-entry daylight oven-dr-aft, however,
does leave the Federal Reserve vulnerable to a loss
on the reserve overdraft. Suppose that after’ the
dealer’ receives the $25 in book-entry securities,
there is an announcement that implies a $15 loss
in thevalue of the other assets of BankA, as in the
other illustrations. Under current an’angements,
the Fedhas no claim on the $25 in book-entry
securities that had been transferred to Bank A, to
offset its $5 loss. Thus, collateral agreements be-
tween clearing banks and the dealer’s make Fed-
er-al Reserve losses due to defaults by government
securities dealer-s unlikely, but the daylight reserve
2Task Force (1988), p. 69. ~Task Force (1988), p. 70—72.
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overdn’afts of the clearing banks expose the Fed to
potential losses in the event of large, unantici-
pated declines in the value ofthe assets of the
clearing banks themselves.
A lien by the Federal Reserve against the book-
entry securities in the accounts of the clearing
banks might have little practical significance in
limiting Fed risk. Suppose the public learns during
the daythat aclearing bank maybe bankrupt.
Would the Federal Reserve suddenly seize the
book-entry securities in the account of the clear-
ing bank? Doing so would disrupt the business of
the government securities dealer’s served by the
cleaning bank and, given the high concentration of
business among clearing banks, would disrupt
trading in the whole government securities mar-
ket. The Fed and the other federal supervisory
authorities have been reluctant to close large com-
4Fon a discussion ofhow daylightoverdrafts reflecttransactions
in commercial paperand other financial instruments, see
Large-Dollar Payments System Advisory Group (1988).
mercial banks because of their effects on other-
depository institutions arid the financial markets
in general. A lien on the book-entry securities of
banks might make the supervisory authorities
more reluctant to close alarge hank that also
serves as a clearingbank for’ government securities
dealers.
Issuing and Redeeming Commercial
Paper
The timing ofpayments by banks involved in
issuing and redeeming commercial paper- cn-eates
reserve over-drafts.4 Several banks act as agents for
firms that issue commercial paper’. The agent
banks collect funds from those purchasing the
commercial paper- and transfer’ them to the ac-
counts of those firms issuing the paper. When the
paper’matures, the agent banks collect fr’om the
FEDERAL RESERVE BANKOF ST. LOUIS17
paper issuers and make payments to the holders
of the paper.
When afirm issues commercial paper, the agent
bank generally pays the firm before it receives
payment from those buying the paper. During the
period between the payment to the issuer and the
receipts from the purchasers, the reserve account
of the agent bank falls by the amount of the funds
raised by issuing the commercial paper. The re-
serve balance of the agent bank also falls by the
face amount ofthe issue when the paper matures;
the agent bank generally makes payment to those
holding the paper before receiving payment from
the issuer’.
The effects of these transactions on the balance
sheet ofthe agent bank are illustrated in table A3.
A firm raises $25 by issuing commercial paper.
Bank Ai sthe agent bank, and both the issuer and
purchaser’ of the paper have their demand deposit
accounts at Bank B. Early in the day on which the
commer-cial paper is issued, BankA transfer’s $25
to Bank B, to be credited to the demand deposit
account ofthe issuer. After-that transaction, the
reserve account of Bank Ai soverdrawn by $15. In
this example, the offsetting transaction is a $25
increase in an account called “reserves r’eceiv-
able.” Later that day, the purchaser ofthe paper
arranges for Bank B to send $25 to BankA over
Fedwire, eliminating the reserve overdraft by the
end ofthe day. As in the other balance sheets, the
Federal Reserve is a general creditor of Bank A
while its reserve account is overdrawn.
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